Explaining COP16

biodiversity

Can COP16 stop the biodiversity crisis? Photo credit: Greenpeace Finland via Unsplash


Vox calls COP16 ‘the most important event you’ve never heard of’ and unfortunately, it is true. COP29, the biggest global conference on climate change, has dominated recent headlines: it has been called unfit for purpose, ‘the worst COP’ to date, and has left many delegates feeling deeply betrayed. So, when ‘COP16’ gets brought up in conversation, it is reasonable that many might think of the same conference, only 13 years ago. Nonetheless, this is not quite the case.

…COP16 is the most recent in a series of annual Conventions on Biological Diversity

For those unfamiliar with biodiversity policy, COP16 is the most recent in a series of annual Conventions on Biological Diversity (CBD). Confusingly, it takes on the same abbreviation of ‘COP’ as the climate change conferences since both stand for ‘Conference of the Parties’ and are run by the UN. The previous biodiversity conference in 2022, COP15, was essentially the biodiversity-equivalent of the 2015 Paris Climate Change Agreement, as it established 23 global targets for protecting biodiversity through the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF). Such ambitious goals include restoring 30% of degraded ecosystems, halting species extinction, and reducing harmful financial incentives by at least $500bn per year. COP16 aims to build on COP15’s work, outlining pathways for implementation and setting them in motion.

Such ambitious goals include restoring 30% of degraded ecosystems, halting species extinction, and reducing harmful financial incentives by at least $500bn per year.

COP16’s identity is currently in muddy waters, and the multiple nicknames this conference has received only serve as confirmation. The host nation, Colombia, has called it the ‘people’s COP’—indeed, an estimated 1 million visitors passed through the publicly accessible ‘green zone’ in the city centre of Cali. Others have branded it as ‘the finance COP’, due to the numerous discussions of how private capital can be leveraged to create positive change.

So, what is it all about, and why is it so important? What power does it have to change our lives? Before we delve into the decisions made at COP16, we first have to understand the biodiversity crisis, the development of Conventions on Biological Diversity (CBDs) and the history behind these decisions.

The biodiversity crisis

Loss of biodiversity is accelerating and it is driven by human activity. The Living Planet Report 2024 shows that species have declined in abundance by more than 70% since 1970, and current approaches to nature risk exacerbating this increasing rate of decline. Species-rich areas are particularly under threat, as the extinction of a single organism can destabilise ecosystems and trigger a ‘domino effect’ of extinction, with the potential to lead to wholesale ecosystem collapse.

As with climate change, it is human behaviour behind these statistics. A 2016 paper identified humans as a ‘hyper-keystone species’, meaning that we have a uniquely disproportionate ability to affect food-chain dynamics, ecosystems, and biodiversity. Our impact, on ecosystems far exceeds that of any other top predator. Moreover, in oceans humans have an 11-15 times greater impact than any other species in terms of over-usage and exploitation of resources.

Our impact, on ecosystems far exceeds that of any other top predator.

The biodiversity crisis is not just a threat to the stability of ecological systems, however. It is also incredibly intertwined with our social and economic systems: an April 2023 analysis by PwC found that $58tn of resources, goods and services are moderately or highly dependent on nature—equivalent to 55% of the global GDP. Work by the World Economic Forum (WEF) identifies that environmental risks dominate the risks landscape in short-, medium- and long-term timeframes, and is increasingly recognised as such by civil society and business leaders.

Building the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)

With its unassuming origins three decades ago, the UN Biodiversity Conference has not received much global attention until recently. Biodiversity itself is a rapidly evolving field that is receiving increasing mainstream attention, and this is reflected in global politics—currently, 196 countries are party to the CBD, with the United States being one notorious exception.

It is important to recognise that the 2022 GBF was not the first attempt to create a harmonised, multilateral framework for biodiversity commitments. The Aichi targets, set in October 2010, established 20 goals to be achieved by 2020 for preventing biodiversity loss, restoring lost habitats, and reducing land fragmentation. If you look at the state of the world around you, it becomes clear that these targets were not reached: the Aichi targets were criticised for their ambiguity, complexity and lack of quantification, among other things.

In light of this, the GBF aimed to develop distinct outcome goals for the various elements of biodiversity—species, ecosystem, and genetic diversity—and do so in a way which would lead to genuine change and outcomes. As the first COP since the adoption of the GBF, COP16 was meant to address the implementation and execution of the framework. Hosted in Colombia, one of the most biologically diverse countries in the world, the conference was presided over by Susana Muhamad, Colombia’s environment minister. Key concerns in the lead-up to COP16 included the development of countries’ National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (NBSAP), the protection of Indigenous rights and voices, and the infamous funding problem.

The outcomes of COP16

COP16 has a few victories to show for its time. Major successes include the establishment of Article 8(J), which involves a formal body and process for incorporating Indigenous voices and the Cali Fund, which resolves long-running disputes on how the benefits and profits from genetic data can be more fairly distributed. Both are historical advancements for the protection of the rights of Indigenous and Global South communities, as well as for Afro-descendants, whose contribution and continuing role in protecting biodiversity has been formally recognised.

Nonetheless, COP16 also failed to find urgency and resolution on several fronts: only 15% of countries had sent in NBSAPs by the start of the conference, with the number barely making its way up to 22% by the end. As a result, biodiversity in several major ecosystems has not been addressed. In fact, 12 out of the 17 megadiverse countries, which contain 70% of the world’s biodiversity altogether, had not handed in NBSAPs by the start of the conference—this includes Brazil, the Philippines, and Democratic Republic of the Congo. The US, another megadiverse country, is not even a member of the CBD. The new decision text merely ‘urges parties that have not yet done so… [to hand in NBSAPs] as soon as possible.’ Original suggestions by the UK to include a timeframe of October 2025 were struck down.

Despite running-over by 14 hours, parties did not get through all the issues on their agenda…

In addition, despite running-over by 14 hours, parties did not get through all the issues on their agenda: the creation of a catch-all fund and a monitoring framework has been left for one of the intersessionals between now and COP17 in November next year. This means that progress on funding has remained mixed—the establishment of the Tropical Forest Forever Facility and increased pledges for the Global Biodiversity Framework Fund are relatively small wins against the $942 billion needed to finance the GBF’s 2030 goals. The latter fund has only just reached $396m, after this round of pledges by New Zealand, France, Austria, and Quebec almost doubled its prior amount.

Such official funding plans have also been complemented by ‘innovative’ finance initiatives, most notably biodiversity credits. The International Advisory Panel on Biodiversity Credits launched their ‘high-integrity’ principles for biodiversity markets on October 28th, which will allow firms to trade between biodiversity promotion and offsetting between local areas. These principles reject the possibility of global offsetting, recognising that biodiversity compensation can only occur in similar ecological environments, and establish requirements for defining projects and third-party verification. However, such ideas have been widely critiqued by civil society commentators and academic experts, for their possible  manipulation by companies, lack of in-built incentive to reject ill-formed compensation projects, and the potentially ‘dangerous distraction’ they pose from more transformative solutions.

Overall, despite the significant improvement made on several fronts in COP16, it is clear that there is much to be done. Whether or not the parties to the CBD manage to find urgency and consensus before COP17 in Amenia remains to be seen.


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